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Introduction
Currently, the United States spends more than
$10,000 per person each year on health care, roughly
18% of gross domestic product1 and far more than
other high-income countries.2 At the same time, close
to 80% of the population consistently worry about
access to necessary care.3 There are news reports of
turmoil in the individual insurance marketplace, with
insurers raising prices and threatening to leave markets in the face of both political instability and market
pricing problems as state governments, Congress and
CMS attempt numerous schemes for the purpose of
supporting private insurers so that insurance is available and affordable.4
It is not a leap, in light of these facts, to question
what private insurance offers the United States and
if creating a single, tax payer funded national pool
would, in fact, cause upheaval or loss by disturbing
this industry.
On July 29, 2018, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) approved a waiver for the
Wisconsin healthcare marketplace.5 This waiver,
known as a §1332 waiver,6 creates a federally and state
funded reinsurance or stop-loss program for individual insurance policies sold on the state exchange.
Between 50% and 80% of claims between $50,000
and $250,000 will be paid with tax dollars, with a predicted 83% of the $200 million cost of the program
coming from federal funds.7 The assumption underlying the waiver is that volatility and pricing problems
in the marketplace will be reduced by this plan, reducing federal premium subsidies overall, which reduction, in turn, will fund the waiver.
This waiver and its economic assumptions are one
example of why a national health insurance pool,
funded by tax dollars, will not destabilize the economy
by interrupting a functioning and effective private
insurer marketplace but, rather, will bring stability
and lead to a more efficient and rational insurance
pool. The waiver’s very existence is evidence that
health insurance is not functioning well. As explained
below, these problems extend beyond the individual
marketplace into the entire industry.
With the Wisconsin 1332 waiver, the federal government takes on the task of providing insurance,
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using tax dollars to both shore up the health insurance
industry’s ability to handle health care costs and continue providing the money to pay premiums, as they
are too expensive for many people to afford themselves. Realistically, these are the only two jobs health
insurers have, providing insurance with affordable
premiums, and in Wisconsin’s waiver, we see they cannot perform them.
Given that health care is a significant portion of
the United States economy, however, it is important
to consider how large the financial implications of
dramatically changing the health insurance industry
truly are. As discussed in more detail below, the health
insurance industry is not primarily involved in actu-

low income).10 Additionally, 9.4 million people receive
coverage through Tricare (federal health insurance
for active duty military and their families)11 and more
than 9 million people are cared for by the Veteran’s
Administration (VA) (federal health insurance for
military veterans).12 The coverage numbers above are
then reduced by the people who are enrolled in both
Medicare and Medicaid (known as dual coverage),
which totaled 11.7 million people in 201613 thus totaling 146. Additionally, as of 2016, around 28 million
people had no health insurance, meaning they were
not currently enrolled in any program.14
Almost half of the country receives health insurance through a family member’s or their own employer

the health insurance industry is not primarily involved in actually handling
the tasks associated with insurance for the majority of Americans, given that
it only insures a relatively small percentage of them, is heavily subsidized
by federal and state tax dollars, and has a business model that shifts risks of
medical costs to other parties, carrying relatively little of it itself. Additionally,
insurance companies already handle claims processing for Medicare and
could do so for a new pool, further minimizing any disruption.
ally handling the tasks associated with insurance for
the majority of Americans, given that it only insures
a relatively small percentage of them, is heavily subsidized by federal and state tax dollars, and has a business model that shifts risks of medical costs to other
parties, carrying relatively little of it itself. Additionally, insurance companies already handle claims processing for Medicare8 and could do so for a new pool,
further minimizing any disruption.

The Relatively Small Size of the Private
Health Insurance Marketplace
There are 328 million people in the United States. Of
these, 27% (87 million) have insurance provided by
a private health insurance company as defined here.
This is a significant number, but not an exceptionally
large market share. As of 2018, 44% of the population (around 146 million people) are provided health
insurance through programs run by federal or state
governments. According to Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) data, as of 2018, 59.1 million people were enrolled in Medicare (federal health
insurance for the elderly or disabled);9 and 80 million
people were enrolled in Medicaid (combined federal
and state health insurance for low income people) and
CHIP (a federal program for children of families with
878

(49%,15 161 million people as of 2018) but, due to efficiency concerns and federal law incentives, a large
number of employer insurance plans are “self-insured,”
meaning that the company is responsible for paying all healthcare costs rather than purchasing group
coverage from an existing insurance company.16 Overall, 60% of all employees (96.6 million people) with
employer-sponsored coverage are in self-insured plans,
the majority of them in large companies.17 While these
self-insured companies often hire health insurance
providers to manage the benefits offered, the health
insurance companies are not insuring the beneficiaries.

Widespread Use of Stop Loss Insurance and
Reinsurance
Private insurers carry relatively little risk of having to
pay for expensive medical care due to their widespread
use of stop loss insurance. This can be provided by
governments, as in the example from Wisconsin given
above, purchased from reinsurance or stop loss companies, or provided through complex financial transactions with sophisticated investors. The idea that
health insurers are not actually insuring is counterintuitive, but in fact they often function as middlemen,
bundling and selling risk.18
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For purposes of this discussion, it is helpful to
think of a typical health insurance policy as allocating risk of loss. The funds insurers use to pay healthcare expenses come from premiums that are put into
a pool. Purchasers of insurance are the beneficiaries
of this pool. Beneficiaries who require care also have
additional expenses in addition to their premiums.
A policy generally has a deductible (the amount the
beneficiary must pay before the insurance company
pays anything). There is often a co-payment (a small
amount paid for every doctor or hospital visit) and
co-insurance (the set percentage of costs that the beneficiary will pay after paying the deductible), as well.
Finally, most insurance policies have a cap on beneficiary payments, past which the insurance company
covers the full cost of care for the rest of the calendar
year. A typical plan might have a $1000 deductible for
an individual, a $20 co-payment, 20% co-insurance,
and a cap of $12,000.19 There might also be separate
deductions and co-payments for pharmaceuticals.
Looking at the arrangement described above, the
risk of loss in the plan is transparently broken into a
few tranches (or segments). The beneficiary has the
risk of loss for the first $1000 of care they might need
in any given year. They are, in effect, self-insured for
this. Once they exceed $1000, they share the risk with
the insurance company, 20/80, until they have spent
$12,000 and then bear no risk of loss for medical costs
until the next year. Their total self-insurance liability
is $12,000. With no reinsurance, an insurance company would then bear the risk of loss for any expenses
that exceed the amount paid for by the beneficiary.
That loss, in turn, would be paid from the pool of all
beneficiaries’ premiums.
Given that health insurance companies divide risk
into the tranches described above in most insurance
contracts, it is not surprising that they also purchase
reinsurance for specific levels of claims or costs from
numerous companies. Simply put, the money to purchase the reinsurance comes from the pool of premiums and is used to insure the pool. This behavior is
commonplace in the insurance marketplace and not
nefarious. However, it highlights how health insurance companies often do not actually function as traditional insurers in that they generally do not bear the
risk for larger and/or catastrophic costs, instead purchasing coverage from other entities.
The use of reinsurance and stop loss coverage for
both private insurers and self-insured employers highlights the risk exposure benefits of large health insurance pools and its corollary, the increased exposure
of smaller ones. It is extremely difficult to devise an
insurance product that can cover a small population
for a small chance of an extremely expensive event. It

is possible, even likely, that the expensive event will
never occur, but if it does, the cost is beyond what a
small group can reasonably collect by pooling their
resources. In a bigger pool, it is far more likely the
event will happen, but the cost is spread out.
An example would be if a small community decided
to create its own fire insurance pool. Accounting for
the chance of the occasional fire would be fairly easy. A
fire that spread across an entire neighborhood would
be catastrophic, rare, and most likely drain the insurance resources. Multiple neighborhood fires would be
even more rare and more financially unbearable. If the
pool contained thousands of diverse small communities, however, the larger pool could flatten that spike
of risk exposure. Having multiple communities in the
pool increases the likelihood of a spreading fire, but
the risk would be spread across many more people.
The same logic that applies to the fire insurance
example above applies to health insurance, but with
healthcare many more potentially catastrophic events
have to be considered, making it more complex to predict for a small group.20 Premature births, motorcycle
accidents with brain injuries, and multiple organ transplants happen, but rarely. The larger and more diverse
the pool, the easier it is to flatten all risk spikes across
all participants because a small chance of something
happening becomes a known cost if the population is
big enough and those costs can be accounted for.
For both self-insured employers and private insurers, these spikes are managed by purchasing reinsurance from large reinsurance companies. There are two
main types of reinsurance, ones that protect an insurer
from excessive claims overall (generally referred to as
reinsurance), and ones that function, like the Wisconsin waiver, to cover expensive claims (known as stop
loss insurance for self-insured plans and as excess
medical reinsurance for health insurers). Little data
exists regarding the dollar amount of individual claims
for which insurers or self-insured plans purchase reinsurance. However, it is possible to deduce common
levels by examining laws seeking to limit exceptionally
low stop loss coverage (also known as the “attachment
point”). Maryland, for example, recently temporarily
raised its limit from $10,000 to $22,500.21 In 2002,
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners proposed a model law that prohibited the sale of
stop loss insurance with an attachment point below
$20,000.22 In addition, 60% of reinsurance of this
type sold in the United States has an attachment point
“less than” $150,000 per covered individual.23
Revisiting the typical insurance contract described
above, the beneficiary has the first $1000 of risk, and
then has some share of risk up to $12,000. Using the
co-payments outlined above, a patient would have
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$56,000 of medical bills by the time they reached their
maximum out of pocket costs. The insurance company
would have $44,000 of liability. It is plausible, given
the availability of stop loss insurance products with
low attachment points, that the beneficiary could be
bearing a share of the risk while a different company
bears the rest.24
It is unclear how commonplace these contracts are
with private insurers, as there is no reporting requirement and the companies, themselves, rarely acknowledge this system apart from within filings required

tively expensive claims histories), and risk corridors
(a method of redistributing outsized insurance company profits to companies with higher costs).27 The
Three Rs, in a limited manner, combined the pools of
all insurers in an area, using the combined funds to
offset spikes that any one individual insurer had in its
smaller pool and did so to encourage insurers to enter
these marketplaces.
As the Three Rs wind down, the 1332 waivers such
as Wisconsin’s are now appearing, offering direct federal subsidization through stop loss coverage under

The individual health insurance marketplace is a relatively public and
transparent area where one can clearly observe the limitations of the private
insurance companies. Close to 12 million people purchase their insurance
on a health insurance exchange created by the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA also created a series of temporary risk
management programs to help smooth spikes of cost in small, new,
and/or untested pools as the individual insurance market expanded.
These programs, known as the Three Rs, included risk adjustment
(shifting money from insurers who had less risky populations to those with
riskier populations), reinsurance (collecting money from all health insurers
and using that finite pool of funds to offset relatively expensive claims
histories), and risk corridors (a method of redistributing outsized
insurance company profits to companies with higher costs).
from publicly traded, for profit companies. The products, however, are widely available and the reinsurance
marketplace reports consistent growth in healthcare.

Federal and State Subsidies in the Individual
Marketplace
The individual health insurance marketplace is a
relatively public and transparent area where one can
clearly observe the limitations of the private insurance companies. Close to 12 million people purchase
their insurance on a health insurance exchange25 created by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA).26 The ACA also created a series of temporary risk management programs to help smooth
spikes of cost in small, new, and/or untested pools as
the individual insurance market expanded. These programs, known as the Three Rs, included risk adjustment (shifting money from insurers who had less
risky populations to those with riskier populations),
reinsurance (collecting money from all health insurers and using that finite pool of funds to offset rela880

the theory that this will reduce the cost of insurance
overall, rendering the subsidies budget neutral. It
should be noted that the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) does not necessarily agree with HHS and Wisconsin projections regarding the cost of this type of
program, as it predicted a similar nationwide stop loss
program would cost the federal government $6.8 billion each year.28
Wisconsin’s waiver is important because it shows
that a national taxpayer-based funding mechanism
is uniquely situated to spread risk across the broadest possible population and that this is likely to reduce
insurance costs. The waiver also shows that private
insurers are not functioning well in the insurance
marketplace, given that such a subsidy is required.
Looking at the insurance contract example again,
with Wisconsin’s waiver, the beneficiary would stop
paying co-insurance when their care reached a cost of
$56,000. The federal government would begin paying for their care when it reached $50,000. Assuming a prudent insurance company that has purchased
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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reinsurance for claims that exceed $250,000 (the end
of the federal subsidy), the insurance company would
have a maximum risk of loss of $38,000 for that
beneficiary.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the private insurance market insures a
relatively small proportion of the country, and, due to
reinsurance, stop loss coverage, and various forms of
governmental subsidies, does not provide a substantial amount of actual insurance. Furthermore, private
insurers cannot actually carry the risk of the small
pools they work with. This flaw is deeply embedded
in the system itself, as they cannot escape exposure
to ruinous spikes of loss without cobbling together
numerous inefficient methods of offsetting these risks
to others. A national health insurance pool would
be more efficient at spreading risk and less volatile.
Given the industry’s current business model, where it
appears to do relatively little insuring and instead primarily manages benefits and serves as a middleman
that arranges for other insurers to carry its risks, shifting the industry to managing benefits for a federal
program would not be a change of sufficient magnitude to justify forgoing the benefits of a national pool.
Note
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